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NATIONAL COALITION
FOR PUBLIC
EDUCATION &
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY v.
HARRIS
CHARLES S.

WILSON

Title I of the ESEA1 is a federal program under which the federal
government provides money, usually to local school boards, with which
the local school boards hire teachers to provide remedial educational services for students in both public and nonpublic schools. The issue in the2
National Coalitionfor Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Harris
case was whether it is constitutional for a local educational agency, in this
instance the New York City Board of Education, to hire teachers with
this federal money and send them into parochial schools during regular
school hours to provide those remedial services. This is how the New
York City school board provides Title I services to the public school students. The issue is whether it can provide the services to parochial school
students in the same manner.
The Harris case was filed in February of 1976, but it has a far more
distinguished history, going back 10 years earlier. The original challenge
of Title I was Flast v. Cohen 3 the case which established federal taxpayer
standing to raise an establishment clause challenge to federal aid programs. The expectation after Flast, which was decided on standing
grounds, was that, on remand, the parties would litigate the substantive
issues. In fact, nothing happened to Flast after remand. During the
course of the Harris litigation, we discovered why nothing happened. We
learned that Leo Pfeffer, through timidity, let the Flast case lapse. Mr.
Pfeffer stated in an affidavit filed in support of a motion for a preliminary
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified
in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. (1976)).
' 489 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 808 (1980).
3 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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injunction that after Board of Education v. Allen,4 a case decided on the
same day as Flast, the legal climate was not quite ripe for his challenge of
Title I. So, Mr. Pfeffer decided to wait until the legal climate became
more favorable. In the meantime, Mr. Pfeffer travelled around the country challenging state programs, winning his cases, and creating the more
favorable legal climate he was seeking. In 1975, the Supreme Court decided Meek v. Pittenger,5 a case involving a Pennsylvania statute that, I
think it is fair to say, was molded after Title I. There are some distinctions, but the basic thrust of the Meek program was similar to a Title I
program. The Supreme Court held it unconstitutional. According to Mr.
Pfeffer, the time was ripe to go back after Title I, and with that catalyst,
he filed the Harris case in 1976.
From the beginning, Mr. Pfeffer contended that Meek established a
per se rule that prohibits the use of public money to pay the salaries of
teachers who work in parochial schools during the school day. Mr. Pfeffer
said the case was over.
Well, we did not quite agree with Mr. Pfeffer. We went to one other
case, Wheeler v. Barrera, a Missouri case decided a year before Meek,
involving Title I. In Wheeler, the Court suggested that there may be circumstances in which an on-premise, school-hours program under Title I
would be constitutional. We also took a much closer look at Meek than I
think Mr. Pfeffer had. In taking that closer look, it occurred to us that
the Court was not expressing concerns about what actually had happened
in Pennsylvania under the Meek program. It was a new program that had
been enacted only in 1973. The trial court record was sparse, and there
was very little experience under the program. The Court in Meek said
that it feared certain consequences if publicly paid teachers were placed
in what it characterized as sectarian schools.
In New York, we were dealing with a Title I program which was 10
years old in 1976. By the time we received our decision 31/2 weeks ago, it
was 14 years old. It was a program with a history appropriate for review
to determine if the fears expressed by the Court in Meek had materialized in New York City. The record included some fifty-eight affidavits
ranging from federal officials to parents of students receiving Title I -services. The bulk of the affidavits, however, were from the administrators of
the New York City nonpublic school Title I program and the Title I
teachers themselves. We also put together voluminous documentary exhibits and received the indulgence of the Court for two one-day evidentiary hearings during which we had testimony from key people who had
filed affidavits-the administrator of the program and several teachers.
-

392 U.S. 236 (1968).

5 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
- 417 U.S. 402 (1974).
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The result was a unanimous decision upholding New York City's Title I program for nonpublic school students. Significantly, the opinion is
laced with citations from the record that we developed, tying the legal
analysis very tightly to the factual record before the court.
The question now is, what is next? To that, I cannot give an answer
at present. Mr. Pfeffer has been uncharacteristically silent since the
Court ruled 31/2 weeks ago. His style, at least based on my own experience, has been to rush to the Court as soon as possible with his notice of
appeal, presenting his jurisdictional statement to the Supreme Court
before one has the chance to digest what the district court has held.
Throughout the district court proceedings in Harris, Mr. Pfeffer said he
fully expected to lose-an incredible position for a man who was relying
on Meek-and promised that if he lost, he would appeal. To date, he has
been silent. There is, in my opinion, some reason to believe there may not
be an appeal. I base this on three factors. One, the opinion itself is tied
very tightly to the evidentiary record. The record contains only the evidence we entered. Mr. Pfeffer put in no evidence of his own, no evidence
that controverted our evidence. So, if the case reaches the Supreme
Court, it will be an uncontroverted record with little room for the Court
to maneuver. The Court cannot, as it did in Meek, ignore the record because of the way the district court opinion was written.
Secondly, Mr. Pfeffer does not have in this case what he had in prior
cases. He is without a record and a dissent to provide a rationale for a
favorable ruling on appeal. Those of you familiar with Lemon v. Kurtzman may recall that the district court upheld the Pennsylvania teacher
salary subsidy program by a 2-to-1 vote.' Judge Hastie dissented. His dissent became the rationale for the majority opinion in the Supreme Court.
So, Leo Pfeffer does not even enjoy the advantage of having a dissenting
opinion upon which to lean. Finally, all that Harris decides is that the
way New York City implements Title I is permissible. During the evidentiary hearing and arguments in Harris, Mr. Pfeffer conceded that New
York was implementing Title I in a constitutional fashion. I think, therefore, that it will be difficult for him to maintain a successful appeal.
What, then, are the implications of Harris? Since we do not know
whether an appeal will be maintained, we cannot be certain that the rationale in the opinion will endure. Assume for a moment that there is no
appeal or, in the event of an appeal, the Supreme Court affirms without
disturbing the district court's rationale. In one sense, Harrisis a very narrow and limited decision. It breaks no new doctrinal grounds; it simply
applies existing establishment clause principles to the facts of the case
before it. It decides only that the way New York City administers the
310 F. Supp 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969), rev'd and remanded, 403 U.S. 606 (1971).
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Title I nonpublic school program is constitutional.
I think, however, that there are some encouraging aspects to this decision. First, it rejects out of hand any contention that Meek intended to
establish a per se rule of any type. Second, it demonstrates that despite
the string of defeats school aid programs have suffered in the 1970's, the
courts still seem willing to evaluate such cases on their merits, if the merits are presented to them. Finally, along with the Supreme Court's decision in Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan 8
this year, it suggests that in the 1980's the courts will be less willing to
accept the presumptions of invalidity that characterize the aid litigation
and aid decisions of the 1970's. I think one lesson of Harris-onethat we
take away from it when we go on to Missouri where there is another Title
I case pending-is the importance of the evidentiary record. Had we met
Mr. Pfeffer on his turf and quarreled solely over whether Meek established a per se rule, with no evidentiary record before the Court, I think
we would have lost. I think the evidentiary record provided the victory, a
victory, I hope, which will be sustained if there is an appeal. I am also
optimistic that despite its limited nature, the Harris decision bodes well
for the future and is a sign that, in the 1980's, schools will begin to share
in tax revenues.
.Thank you.

8

444 U.S. 646 (1980).

